Healthy vs. unhealthy food: a strategic choice for firms and consumers by Fernando Antoñanzas & Roberto Rodríguez-Ibeas
RESEARCH Open Access
Healthy vs. unhealthy food: a strategic choice for
firms and consumers
Fernando Antoñanzas* and Roberto Rodríguez-Ibeas
Abstract
In this paper, we carry out a theoretical analysis of the strategic choice made by firms regarding the type of food
they market when they face consumers who care about the healthy/unhealthy attributes of the product but incur
in emotional/health costs when the food they consume has unhealthy attributes. We consider a two-stage game.
In the first stage, one of the firms chooses the unhealthy content of its product. In the second stage, both firms
simultaneously decide their prices. We find that, depending on the parameters of the model, product
differentiation can be maximal or less than maximal. The firm that produces the unhealthy food charges a higher
price and obtains a larger share of the market unless the emotional/health costs and the unhealthy food
production costs are relatively high. We also find that educational campaigns will not always reduce the demand
for the unhealthy food or the degree of the unhealthy attribute.
JEL Classification:I10, I18, L11
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Background
A growing proportion of the food we eat is produced by
industrial processes that combine a main ingredient
with other ingredients to make the final product better
looking and better tasting. Likewise, these procedures
add value to the final product. For instance, flour is the
main ingredient of bread, which for many generations
was one of the basic foods for breakfast and snacks;
however, bread has a relative low added value compared
to croissants, donuts, cakes, cookies, brownies, and the
like, which are nowadays commonly eaten. Flour is also
an ingredient of these products although its proportion
is lower than that found in plain bread. As a result, we
eat more sugar and fat than needed, which are consid-
ered major causes of obesity.
Obesity trends are clearly upwards over the world. In
the US, the percentage of people who are overweight is
near 40% for men and around 30% for women [1]. In
Europe the situation is a little bit better regarding the
rates but the trend is similar to the US. For instance, in
Spain, obesity rates are around 20% for the population
over 25 years [2] and, in some regions, the percentage
of people who are overweight is around 37% [3]. Caused
by either the lack of calories consumption or the excess
of calories intake, these obesity growing rates have many
causes; some authors have analysed them from an eco-
nomic point of view. As summarised by [4], the neoclas-
sical economic point of view highlights several issues:
the relative low price of food as compared to other con-
sumption goods, the increase in the costs of calorie
expenditure (the sedentary lifestyle of consumers) and
the addictive features of unhealthy food. Further, it has
been recently tested that declining food prices is one
likely cause of the obesity epidemic [5]. Less evidence
backs up the more controversial hypothesis that relative
prices of healthy-unhealthy food have direct conse-
quences on obesity. (See, for instance, [6]). In addition
to the neoclassical arguments, other authors have
focused on the behavioral theory of weight, pointing out
that self-control and time-inconsistent preferences con-
stitute the main explanation for obesity [7].
In spite of growing empirical economic literature deal-
ing with obesity, theoretical analysis of decisions con-
cerning the type of product (healthy or unhealthy) that
firms sell in the market has received less attention. This
choice depends, among other factors, on consumers’
preferences and production costs. Regarding the latter, a
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priori, it can be assumed that the production costs of
healthy goods are relatively low. Products traditionally
considered healthy (for example, bread or plain cookies
with no or low fat, sugar and salt content) are usually
produced with simple industrial processes, and its pro-
duction costs are indeed rather low. However, there are
products with low levels of preservatives that lately have
been labelled as healthy (organic, ecological and func-
tional food) and whose production entails higher costs.
The same distinction regarding production costs can be
applied to unhealthy products. Thus, production of
unhealthy food can be more expensive than that of
healthy food (a cookie and a simple biscuit) or viceversa
(ecological food versus non-ecological food).
On the demand side, some consumers are concerned
about the proportion of unhealthy food, mainly products
associated with obesity and cardiovascular diseases, that
they eat. They read the labels of the industrially pro-
cessed foods when available and incorporate this infor-
mation into their decisions. However, other consumers
value the external physical characteristics of food such
as form, colour, smell, and taste, and disregard the
further health consequences of their diet. More pre-
cisely, goods have several attributes from which consu-
mers derive utility. In the case of food, the nutritional
value is one of the main ones, some intrinsic attributes
are directly linked to other hedonistic issues such as
taste, the way that food was obtained and produced, as
well as the healthy/unhealthy ingredients that the pro-
duct contains. Further, individuals derive utility from
other societal aspects related to the consumption of
food such as belonging to a group of socially conscious
people that is concerned with healthy food, the sustain-
ability of the environment and its long-term health; con-
sequently they invest in health by eating purely healthy
products that may or may not be visually attractive or
taste good. That is to say, consumers value additional
societal attributes of the products. Further, some
unhealthy products have two kind of effects: on the one
hand they produce utility derived from their taste while
eating them but on the other, they also have immediate
negative consequences resulting from their consumption
(long digestion, stomachache, dizziness, etc.).
Conventional utility functions that only incorporate
satisfaction derived from physical attributes of goods are
not an accurate description of what really matters to
consumers. In this sense, neuroeconomics could help to
better describe consumer behaviour [8,9]. For instance,
a utility function that summarises satisfaction derived
from the consumption of food could contain elements
from the biological response to physical hunger, ele-
ments related to the pleasure of eating something that
appeals to taste (intangible or hedonistic) and also
elements related to sociological aspects (again intangi-
ble) such as remorse for eating unhealthy food or food
contrary to social habits. Some of these elements are
taken into account by individuals when they make their
consumption decisions. and may have important conse-
quences for the type of food produced by firms, in their
market shares and in the prices. At the same time, firms
that intend to satisfy individual needs know these ele-
ments, and have to make a strategic choice regarding
the type of food they produce. Firms will try to differ-
entiate their products by choosing features (either
healthy or unhealthy) with the aim of gaining market
share and increasing their profits.
In this paper, we consider a stylized model of vertical
differentiation applied to food. In particular, we analyze a
duopolistic market in which firms must decide the type of
food they produce. One of the firms produces a healthy
food without unhealthy attributes while the other firm
makes decisions about the degree of unhealthy attributes
in its product. We have chosen to model the decision
made by firms that differentiate their products by adding a
tasteful and unhealthy component such as fat or sugar
instead of focusing on the decision of “healthy” firms. This
choice is based on both the casual observation of the real
world where the supply of food containing unhealthy com-
ponents has grown enormously and on the fact that the
first historical differentiation in food products came by
adding them these components. On the demand side, we
assume that consumers value the unhealthy attribute but,
as mentioned above, they have some emotional/health
costs derived from the consumption of the unhealthy pro-
duct. Utility functions with arguments not directly related
to the pleasure of consumption are also used in environ-
mental product differentiation models [10,11].
We model the relationship between the firms as a
two-stage game. In the first stage, one of the firms
makes choices about the unhealthy content of its pro-
duct. In the second, stage, both firms simultaneously
decide their prices. We characterize the optimal
degree of the unhealthy attribute as well as the equili-
brium prices. Finally, we carry out a welfare analysis
and suggest some public policies that could be
implemented.
Methods
We consider a standard duopolistic model of vertical pro-
duct differentiation.(a) Firm i produces a good (food) with
healthy hi and unhealthy si attributes and sells it at price
pi, i Î {1, 2}. Products of both firms have the same
healthy attribute, h1 = h2 = h, but only firm 2 produces a
good with unhealthy attribute: s1 = 0 and s2 = s, where s
Î [0, 1]. For the sake of simplicity and without loss of
generality, we will assume that h = 1. Firm 2 can produce
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the unhealthy attribute s at a cost C(s), with C(0) = 0,
C’(s) > 0, C“(s) > 0 and C’(0) = 0. To simplify the analysis,
we assume that marginal production costs for both firms
are zero.
There is a continuum of consumers indexed by θ,
which is uniformly distributed in the interval [0, 1]
with density one. The parameter θ measures the
degree of emotional guilt derived from consuming a
good with unhealthy attributes. Alternatively, it can be
thought that θ denotes individual characteristics
reflecting how unhealthy attributes affect consumer’s
health. All consumers obtain a utility of 1 if they con-
sume the good produced by firm 1. The utility derived
from consuming the good of firm 2 is given by 1 + s -
θd, where d Î [0, 1] denotes the emotional or the
health-related-quality-of-life impact on utility. Consu-
mers value the unhealthy attribute (e.g. the product
tastes better), but, at the same time, they feel guilty for
consuming a good with a higher unhealthy attribute.
Thus, consumers differ in their feelings of guilt. Other-
wise, they are identical, and their reservation prices
equal to 1 and 1 + s for the goods of firms 1 and 2.
Consumers buy as long as their net utility is non-nega-
tive. Each consumer is assumed to buy, at most, one
unit of the product. There is a health cost ls, with l Î
[0, 1], per each consumed unit of the unhealthy pro-
duct. Consumers internalize the emotional or the
health-related-quality-of-life impact on utility when
they made their consumption decisions. However, they
do not take into account the health costs derived from
unhealthy consumption borne by the public health
system.
We consider a two-stage game. In the first stage, firm
2 decides the level of the unhealthy attribute s. In the
second stage, the firms set simultaneously their prices.
We solve the game by backward induction, and find the
subgame perfect equilibrium. Our goal is to characterize
the equilibrium prices and the optimal level of the
unhealthy attribute.
The firms’ demand functions
Given (p1, p2), the consumer indifferent to both goods
has a degree of guilt θˆ that satisfies:
1 − p1 = 1 + s − θˆd − p2
Therefore, θˆ =
s + p1 − p2
d
. When θˆ ∈ (0, 1), firm 1
sells to consumers with high degree of guilt while firm 2
sells to consumers with a degree of guilt below θˆ. When
θˆ ≥ 1, no consumers patronize firm 1. When θˆ ≤ 0, all
consumers buy from firm 1. Notice that consumers buy
from firm 2 if and only if 1+s -θd - p2 ≥ 0, e.g. if and
only if θ ≤ θ¯, where θ¯ = 1 + s − p2
d
. As p1 ≤ 1, it follows
that θ¯ > θˆ.
(b)
Firm 1’s demand is given by:
D1(p1, p2, s, d) =
⎧⎨
⎩
0 if p1 ≥ p2 + d − s
1 − θˆ if p1 ∈ (p2 − s, p2 + d − s)
1 if p1 ≤ p2 − s
Firm 2’s demand is given by:
D2(p1, p2, s, d) =
⎧⎨
⎩
0 if p2 ≥ p1 + s
θˆ if p2 ∈ (p1 + s − d, p1 + s)
1 if p2 ≤ p1 + s − d
With the demand functions for both firms defined, we
focus now on finding the equilibrium prices. In order to
do that, we first characterise the firms’ reaction functions.
The reaction function of firm 1
Given p2 and s, firm 1 selects the price p1 to maximize
its profits. Let p2 Î(s - d, s]. In this case, firm 1’s best







d − s − p1 + p2
d
]
s.t. p1 ∈ (0, p2 − s + d)
It is easy to verify that the solution to this problem is
given by p1 = f (p2) = 0.5(d + p2 - s). Let p2 ≤ s - d. In
this case, for all p1, firm 1’s demand is zero.
Finally, let p2 > s. Firm 1 may choose p1 = f (p2) = p2 -
s and serve the whole market. Alternatively, it can select








d − s − p1 + p2
d
]
s.t. p1 ∈ (p2 − s, p2 − s + d)
The solution to this problem is p1 = f (p2) = 0.5(d +
p2 - s) as long as p2 < s + d. Thus, for p2 Î (s, s + d),
we have two candidates for firm 1’s best response. It
can be easily shown that firm 1’s profits are higher
when it chooses p1 = f(p2) = 0.5(d + p2 - s). When p2 ≥
s + d, firm 1’s best response is p1 = f (p2) = p2 - s. Thus,
the firm 1’s reaction function is:
p1 = f (p2, s, d) =
{
0.5 (d + p2 − s) if p2 ∈ [s − d, s + d)
p2 − s if p2 ≥ s + d (1)
Notice that when s - d > 0, there are feasible prices
for firm 2 (p2 ≤ s - d) such that firm 1, regardless of its
price, sells nothing. When s - d ≤ 0, firm 1’s best
response is such that its demand is strictly positive for
all feasible p2.
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The reaction function of firm 2
Given p1 and s, firm 2 selects the price p2 to maximize
its profits. Let d - s ≥ 0 and consider p1 > d - s. Firm 2
may choose p2 = g(p1) = p1 + s - d and serve the whole
market. Alternatively, it can select a higher price, facing
a demand of θˆ. In this case, it solves:
max p2θˆ = p2
[
s + p1 − p2
d
]
s.t. p2 ∈ (p1 + s − d, p1 + s)
The solution to this problem is p2 = g(p1) = 0.5(s+p1)
as long as p1 < 2d - s. Thus, for p1 Î (d - s, 2d - s), we
have two candidates for firm 2’s best response. It is
straightforward to show that firm 2’s profits are higher
when p2 = g(p1) = 0.5(s + p1). When p1 ≥ 2d - s, firm
2’s best response is p2 = g (p1) = p1 + s - d. When p1 ≤
d - s, firm 2’s best response is p2 = g(p1) = 0.5(s + p1).
Thus, firm 2’s reaction function when d - s ≥ 0 is
given by:
p2 = g(p1, s, d) =
{
0.5 (s + p1) if p1 < 2d − s
p1 + s − d if p1 ≥ 2d − s (2)
Let d - s < 0. If 2d - s ≤ 0, firm 2’s reaction function is
given by p2 = g(p1) = p1 + s - d for all p1. If 2d - s > 0,
firm 2’s reaction function is given by (2).
Results and discussion
The equilibrium prices
A pair of prices (p∗1, p
∗
2) is an equilibrium in the pricing
subgame if and only if p∗1 = f (p
∗





Let 2d - s ≤ 0. From (2), firm 2’s best response is p2 =
g(p1, s, d) = p1 + s - d ∀p1 and the equilibrium price of
firm 2 is s - d. Firm 1 does not sell anything. (c)
Let 2d - s > 0. Notice that two possible situations can
happen: either d ≥ s or d < s. It can be shown that,
regardless of the relationship between d and s, the equi-







It can be easily checked from (1) and (2) that




1, s, d) = p
∗
2.
Proposition 1 Let 2d - s ≤ 0. In equilibrium, firm 2
chooses a price p2 = s - d, and firm 1 sells nothing. Let








When the level of the unhealthy attribute is relatively
high compared to d (s ≥ 2d), product differentiation is
so big that, in equilibrium, all consumers prefer to
patronize firm 2. The highest net utility consumers can
obtain from consuming the good from firm 1 is 1. That
will happen if p1 = 0. However, in equilibrium, all con-
sumers obtain a level of net utility above 1 when they
patronize firm 2. Thus, firm 1 sells nothing. When the
level of the unhealthy attribute is relatively low com-
pared to d (s < 2d), product differentiation is so small
that, in equilibrium, both firms share the market. Con-
sumers with high degrees of emotional guilt find it prof-
itable to patronize firm 1.




0 if s ≥ 2d
2d − s
3d





1 if s ≥ 2d
s + d
3d
if s < 2d
(4)
It is easy to see that firm 1’s demand lowers with s
and firm 2’s demand rises with s. The higher the pro-
duct differentiation, the more firm 2 sells. Also, firm 1’s
demand increases with d while firm 2’s demand
decreases with d. From Proposition 1 and the equili-
brium demands, it easily follows that firm 2 will charge
a higher price and enjoy a larger market share if 2s > d.
The determination of the optimal s
In the first stage, firm 2 chooses the level of the
unhealthy attribute that maximizes its profits. From now
on, we will assume that C(s) = 0.5cs2 with c Î (0, 1]. By
taking into account the equilibrium prices in the second




s − d − 0.5cs2 if s ≥ 2d
(s + d)2
9d
− 0.5cs2 if s < 2d (5)
When s ≥ 2d, firm 2 serves the entire market, and its
revenues are s - d. When s < 2d, firm 2 sells to consu-
mers with degrees of guilt below θˆ. From (4),




Let d > 0.5. In this case, firm 2’s profit function is given
by (s + d)
2
9d
− 0.5cs2 ∀s ∈ [0, 1]. The optimal level of the
unhealthy attribute s* satisfies
d2(s∗)
ds
≥ 0. Taking the







It follows that s∗ =
2d
9dc − 2 if 2 < d(9c - 2) and s* = 1
otherwise. When d is relatively high, we have maximal
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product differentiation for values of c that are relatively
low. For high values of c, the level of the unhealthy
attribute is below the highest feasible value, and product
differentiation is less than maximal. As the unhealthy
attribute is costly to produce and emotional costs are
too high, firm 2 optimally chooses a level of the
unhealthy attribute below 1.





1 if 2 ≥ d(9c − 2)
2d
9dc − 2 if 2 < d(9c − 2)
When d > 0.5, once we take into account the optimal
selection of the unhealthy attribute, we have that firm 2
will charge a higher price and enjoy a larger market
share unless the condition 6 < 9dc is satisfied. Notice
that this will happen when the emotional impact on uti-
lity derived from consuming the unhealthy good (d) and
the parameter c of the cost function of such a good are
relatively high.
Let d ≤ 0.5. In this case, firm 2’s profit function is
given by (5). Firm 2 can choose the level of s that solves:
max s − d − 0.5cs2
s.t. s ∈ [2d, 1]
We can easily verify that the objective function is
strictly increasing for all s. Thus, firm 2 would choose
the highest value of s, e.g. s = 1, and its profits would be
Π2 (1) = 1 - d - 0.5c. Alternatively, firm 2 can choose





s.t. s ∈ [0, 2d)
It follows that the solution to this problem is
s =
2d
9dc − 2 if 1 < 3dc. If 1 ≥ 3dc, the objective function
is strictly increasing for all s and the optimal level of the
unhealthy attribute is s* = 1, as firm 2’s profits are higher
for s ≥ 2d:
For 1 < 3dc, we have two candidates for the optimal
level of s: either s* = 1 or s∗ =
2d
9dc − 2. By plugging into
the profit function s∗ =
2d








9dc − 2. By comparing firm 2’s profits






− 2(1) = 9dc
2 + 2c(10d2 − 1 + 9d) + 4(1 − d)
2(9dc − 2) (6)
A sufficient condition for the numerator of (6) to be
positive is that 10d2 - 1 + 9d ≥ 0. But this condition is
always satisfied as d >
1
3
in the region we are
considering. Therefore, firm 2 optimally chooses
s∗ =
2d
9dc − 2 when 1 < 3dc and d ≤ 0.5.





1 if 1 ≥ 3dc
2d
9dc − 2 if 1 < 3dc
When d > 0.5, once we take into account the optimal
selection of the unhealthy attribute, we have that firm 2
will charge a higher price and enjoy a larger market
share for all values of d and c.
The optimal level of the unhealthy attribute is
depicted in Figure 1 below.
As we can see, the parameter space is divided into
three regions. In region I, the only firm in the market is
firm 2. It chooses the maximum feasible level of the
unhealthy attribute. This holds for all values of c and
d ≤ 13. When d ∈ ( 13 , 0.5], firm 2 chooses optimally the
highest level of the unhealthy attribute as long as the
cost c is relatively low (c ≤ 1
3d
). In region II, both firms
are in the market. Firm 2 chooses the maximum level
of product differentiation. Note that in this region, d is
relatively high (above 0.5) and the parameter c is rela-
tively low (c ≤ 2(1 + d)
9
). Although the emotional/health
cost d is high, the 9 low cost c still makes it profitable
for the firm to choose the highest feasible level of the
unhealthy attribute. In region III, the parameter c is
Figure 1 The optimal level of the unhealthy attribute.
Antoñanzas and Rodríguez-Ibeas Health Economics Review 2011, 1:4
http://www.healtheconomicsreview.com/content/1/1/4
Page 5 of 8
relatively high. Consequently, it is optimal for firm 2 to
choose a level of the unhealthy attribute below 1. In
this region, for a given d, the optimal level of the
unhealthy attribute diminishes with c. Likewise, for a
given c, the optimal level of the unhealthy attribute
diminishes with d.
Welfare analysis and public policy
Social welfare is defined as the sum of consumers’ sur-
plus and firms’ profits minus the production cost of the
unhealthy attribute and the health costs. From a social
perspective, the negative emotional impact on consu-
mers’ utility derived from consuming unhealthy pro-
ducts do not enter the social welfare function. Thus,
social welfare is given by:
W(s, d) = D1(p1, p2, s, d) + (1 + s)D2(p1, p2, s, d) − C(s) − lsD2(p1, p2, s, d)
= 1 + s(1 − l)D2(p1, p2, s, d) − C(s)
Let d > 0.5. From (4) and Proposition 2, it follows






(9dc − 2)2 if 2 < d(9c − 2)
1 +
(1 + d)(1 − l)
3d
− 0.5c if 2 ≥ d(9c − 2)
We are interested in analyzing how social welfare






Thus, if 2 - 3l < 0, the higher d, the larger social wel-
fare is. So, from a social perspective, policies that
increase the emotional costs from unhealthy consump-
tion are desirable. We need sufficiently large health
costs. On the other hand, if 2 - 3l ≥ 0, it would be con-
venient to implement policies that reduce the emotional
costs.




policies that reduce emotional costs are unambiguously
desirable
Let d ≥ 0.5. From (4) and Proposition 3, it follows






(9dc − 2)2 if 1 < 3dc
2 − l − 0.5c if 1 ≥ 3dc
Social welfare does not depend on d when 1 ≥ 3dc.
Thus, public policies that change d do not have any
effect on social welfare. When 1 < 3dc, we have the
same result than before for the case 2 < d(9c - 2). The
following propositions summarise the results.
Proposition 4 Let d > 0.5. When 2 < d(9c - 2), public
policies that increase the emotional costs are socially desir-
able if and only if 2 - 3l < 0. If 2 ≥ d(9c - 2), public policies
that reduce emotional costs are unambiguously required.
Proposition 5 Let d ≤ 0.5. When 1 < 3dc, public poli-
cies that increase the emotional costs are socially desir-
able if and only if 2 - 3l < 0. When 1 ≥ 3dc, public
policies that influence d do not have any impact on
social welfare.
It has been argued that, from a social perspective,
unhealthy consumption should be discouraged. How-
ever, consumers enjoy consuming unhealthy products,
although they may be unaware of its negative health
effects. At the same time, as consumers are willing to
pay higher prices for unhealthy products, firms will be
interested in manufacturing products with higher levels
of unhealthy attributes. When all elements are taken
into account, it is not clear which public policy is the
best. According to the results of the model, unhealthy
consumption should be discouraged when health social
costs are sufficiently high. It is also required d and c to
be sufficiently high. In this case, policies that increase
the emotional costs d are unambiguously desirable.
Counterintuively, when c is relatively low, the best pol-
icy is to reduce the emotional costs. When d is quite
low (d ≤ 1
3
), acting on d does not have any effect in
welfare. For d ∈ ( 13 , 0.5], increasing d is socially desirable
only if c and l are sufficiently high. Otherwise, social
welfare does not depend on d. Thus, we must be very
careful about public policy recommendations, as the
final effects can be the opposite to those pursued.
So far, we have focused on social welfare. However, in
the real world, health authorities are mainly concerned
with the intake of unhealthy food. In the context of the
model, the aggregate consumption of the unhealthy
attribute is given by s∗(d, c)D∗2(s
∗(d, c), d) and health
authorities attempt to reduce this consumption. As con-
sumption of unhealthy products generates a negative
externality, fiscal policies that levy taxes on unhealthy
products have been proposed. These policies would
reduce firm 2’s sales and the level of s. These policies
have been criticized as a moderate consumption of
unhealthy food does not necessarily have pernicious
effects on health (see Cash et al.(2005)). Leaving aside
fiscal policies, health authorities can educate consumers
through publicity campaigns emphasizing the negative
effects derived from unhealthy consumption. These
campaigns are designed to promote healthy consump-
tion habits by making more costly (in emotional terms)
to consume unhealthy products. In our model, these
campaigns would increase the parameter d. It is
assumed that publicity campaigns are fully effective in
Antoñanzas and Rodríguez-Ibeas Health Economics Review 2011, 1:4
http://www.healtheconomicsreview.com/content/1/1/4
Page 6 of 8
affecting the emotional costs. When emotional costs are
low (region I), policies that marginally increase d do not
have any impact on both s* and firm 2’s sales as they
do not depend on d. A non-marginal increase in d
(to move to region II or III) is needed to reduce the
aggregate consumption of the unhealthy attribute.
In region II, the aggregate consumption of the
unhealthy attribute is given by firm 2’s sales as s*(d, c) is




clearly diminishes with d.
In region III, firm 2’s sales are:
D∗2(s
∗(d, c), d) =





and the aggregate consumption of the unhealthy attri-
bute is given by:
s∗(d, c)D∗2(s




9dc − 2) =
6d2c
(9dc − 2)2
It can be easily checked that the higher d, the lower
the aggregate consumption of the unhealthy attribute.
In this case, both s*(d, c) and D∗2(s
∗(d, c), d) are lowered
with d. Thus, public policies that increase the emotional
costs of unhealthy consumption are desirable.
Conclusions
In this paper, we have carried out a theoretical analysis
of the strategic choice made by firms regarding the type
of food they market when they face consumers who not
only care for the healthy/unhealthy attributes of the pro-
duct but also experience emotional/health negative feel-
ings when the food they consume has unhealthy
characteristics. In particular, we have considered a duo-
polistic mode of vertical product differentiation to
explore the decisions made by the firms regarding the
type of food they produce and its consequences on
prices and market shares. To simplify the analysis, we
have assumed that one firm produces a healthy product
while the other firm has to decide the degree of the
unhealthy attribute in its product. Once the characteris-
tics of the unhealthy product are fixed, firms compete in
prices and choose simultaneously their prices. We find
that, depending on the parameters of the model, pro-
duct differentiation can be maximal or less than maxi-
mal. Maximal product differentiation takes place when
the production costs of the unhealthy attribute are rela-
tive low. When these costs get higher, maximal product
differentiation can still take place, but consumers must
have a relatively low emotional/health cost. For suffi-
ciently high costs, the degree of product differentiation
is less than maximal. The firm that produces the
unhealthy food charges a higher price and obtains a
higher share of the market for almost all the feasible
values of the exogenous parameters.
We have also explored the kind of public policies that
can be undertaken in order to reduce the aggregate con-
sumption of the unhealthy attribute. Besides fiscal poli-
cies that increase the price of the unhealthy food and
discourage its consumption, educational campaigns have
been considered. In the context of the model, these
informational campaigns affect the emotional/health
costs that consumers experience when they consume
the unhealthy product. As was expected, we find that,
depending on the parameters of the model, it is valuable
to carry out these campaigns as they may reduce the
demand of the unhealthy food as well as the degree of
the unhealthy attribute. However, these policies do not
have any effect when the emotional/health costs are
relatively low. It remains an empirical question to esti-
mate the value of these costs to determine whether edu-
cational campaigns may have a negative effect in the
consumption of the unhealthy food.
The model, as stated, is highly stylized, and can be
extended in several directions. Although mentioned, we
have not analyzed public policies based on fiscal instru-
ments to influence the production of the unhealthy
product. Likewise, the description of consumers’ prefer-
ences could be modified to include horizontal as well as
vertical elements. After all, some attributes of food can
be conceptualized as having horizontal features, while
others (taste, quality, etc.) are vertical in their nature.
The static nature of the model does not allow one to
analyze long-term effects on health derived from
unhealthy consumption habits. From the perspective of
health authorities, this issue is important as health
expenditures have increased considerably in developed
countries during the last decade. A growing proportion
of health expenditures is dedicated to treat health pro-
blems related to obesity. Thus, an interesting extension
of the model would be to analyze, in a dynamic context,
decisions for food production and consumption when
there are future negative health effects. In this sense, the
addictive component of the unhealthy food as well as
self-control and time inconsistent preferences on the
demand side should be taken into account. We hope to
explore some of these issues in further research
Endnotes
aSee [12,13] and [14] for standard product differentia-
tion models.
bNote that firm 1 will never choose a price above 1 as
its demand would be zero.
cWe can eliminate this equilibrium by restricting the
parametric space for d. If d Î (0.5, 1], this equilibrium
is not feasible as 2d - s > 0 for all feasible values of d
and s.
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